Since we are talking about the return of religion to the public forum, I will start with a "sign of the times." In late August, the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, invited over 1000 religious and spiritual leaders from faiths from all over the world to meet in the General Assembly Hall of the United Nations in New York to bond with the United Nations and among themselves to promote peace, especially regional and local peace; to eradicate poverty; and to motivate and energize environmental initiatives. An extraordinary historic global event about which one Jewish Rabbi joked, "If God was really dead in the 60's, He is surely very much alive again!" I had the great privilege of being invited to participate in this largely unexpected happening.
Presently there is a surge—many call it an explosion—in three interrelated phenomena on the world scene—globalization, religion, and NGOs [non-profit organizations]; some call them, positively, CSOs, [civil society organizations]. I will identify these phenomena briefly and attempt to disentangle some of their more significant interrelationships. I hold that much of the explosion in NGOs worldwide and in the new interest in religion and spirituality stems from reaction to and as a consequence of economic, political, social and cultural fallout from the more ruthless processes of globalization, especially on weaker and poorer regions, communities and individuals. I will try to establish the significance of some of these forces of reaction and the consequence for globalization and civil society in the future.
Globalization
Globalization and its consequences are much more pervasive and destructive than the passing benign internal restructuring of the world's economic system that most economists would have us believe is happening. Economists tend to fasten on the benefits of intense competition involved in globalization of the free market rather than on the negative human fallout from it. Others, including many religious groups, focus attention on this negative fallout and so see globalization, primarily, as a new and more sophisticated phase of western or American economic imperialism. For them, while the international community talks of people-centered sustainable development for the poor, the unfettered competitive forces of deregulated free-market globalization are being driven ever faster by transnational corporations, especially financial corporations and banks. These giants are far from people-centered. With their formidable mobile power to plan and communicate globally, they easily undermine the national policies of local governments in their drive to make "made-in-the-world" products in a single world market and to foster huge speculative profits on mobile short-term investments, called "hot money." They ignore, if not destroy, local cultural and spiritual values with impunity and are effectively widening the gap between rich and poor everywhere. In fact, globalization, for this group, is presently globalizing, that is, spreading the rich-poor, developed-underdeveloped gap to every country on the globe.
Supporting evidence is not lacking for this position. For example, Thomas Xavier Kocherry, Coordinator of the National Alliance of Peoples Movements in India, on receiving the Sophie prize, the international environment and development prize, in June 1999, pointed out that, "Today the 20% Northern minority of humankind has: 82.7% of the world gross national product; 81.2% of world trade; 94.6% of all commercial lending; 80.5% of all domestic investment; 80.6% of all domestic savings; 90% of all research and development." In other words, "the Northern 20% are better placed to take away even the 10–20% of the wealth in the hands of 80% people in the South."
Other observers, like the respected Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington, see globalization as fostering an emerging clash of cultures and civilizations that means for future history "the west versus the rest" ["The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking World Order," 1996]. And, finally, there are those who, without denying the negative potential of globalization, emphasize its positive potential, as a global information society that can enhance human cooperation worldwide, especially through massive use of the Internet. This is, for example, the approach of Farhang Rajaee, an Iranian political scientist, in his new publication, "Globalization on Trial: The Human Condition and the Information Society"0 [IDRC, the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, 1999]. It is also the perspective of UNDP's new study, "Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century" [Oxford, 1999]. R.F.M Lubbers, former prime minister of the Netherlands, developed the same theme in a presentation he made on "Democracy in a Globalizing World," at an international seminar on Globalization, a Challenge for Peace: Solidarity or Exclusion?, organized in Milan, in October 1999, by the International Jacques Maritain Institute. These last writers consider globalization, primarily, as a complex of rapidly changing ambiguous processes.
My aim here is to put human concerns at the centre of the globalization debate, that is, to focus on the global interrelationships and interdependencies of people, and not just of financial flows. The new communications technology, whose product is knowledge, while potentially an inclusive and humanly enriching process, is presently being used to widen the gap between rich and poor. In particular, it is causing a major demographic problem, because it simply cannot provide the billions of new jobs required in burgeoning cities, especially in the poor world where the majority of workers are still manual workers with few sophisticated skills.
It is in this context that I like Lubber's broader definition of globalization as "a technologically and ideologically driven process in which geographic distance becomes irrelevant for sociocultural, political and economic relations. People become conscious of this fact. Therefore, networks of relations and dependencies become (potentially) border crossing and even worldwide." [op. cit., page l]. In this process the state is seen as losing some of its governance capacity; indeed, its role changes significantly as it becomes more and more enmeshed in a growing network of inter-country and international organizations, such as the UN, the new European community, IMF, WTO, NAFTA, the new World Court, etc. As Lubber points out, this "new democracy of nation states together" brings many benefits but has yet to mature sufficiently to prevent present-day major security, social, ecological and democratic deficits. The security deficit is evident in the many recently failed states, such as Rwanda, Congo, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, to name only a few, since the sad fact is that almost every state in Africa is presently in danger of falling into chaos. Hence the huge refugee problems that continue to grow in size and complexity each day with little evidence that the international community knows how to handle them either technically, humanly or morally. The social deficit is clear in the widening gap between rich and poor and permanent massive unemployment and underemployment with accompanying unacceptable health and labour conditions in most parts of the world. The ecological deficit is presently largely a byproduct of the global economy's drive for the lowest common denominator standard in health and labour costs and steadfast refusal to accept the environmental limits to economic growth. And, finally, the democratic deficit derives from the simple fact that on the international level there is still no representation of ordinary people. And the more international and supranational levels gain in terms of world governance, the less power there will be for elected parliaments and the bigger the democratic deficit will become—at least in our traditional democratic ideal of having all the people participate actively as citizens in their own governance.
We should not forget that, however complex the processes of globalization, the prime movers are presently the new electronic information and communications technology and the "hegemony of American values," to use Lubber's expression. But these two forces do not necessarily work as a team. The information society is revealing the clear inadequacy not only of the modern state but also of Western modernism itself, as well as of its derivative, compartmentalized or reductionist science, as universal paradigms for today's world, and so tends to undermine the validity of American values for the future. Globalization is revealing the exclusivist nature of this approach, and opening the door to uncertainty, multiculturalism, pluralism and dialogue on every front, as these supposedly universal western ideologies, and the institutions that embody them, begin to crumble.
The need for international cooperation to temper the present out-of-control ideology of relentless competition and creative conflict becomes daily more evident. Because globalization is threatening traditional politics based on territory as well as scientific disciplines that have little grip on this new phenomenon, thinkers like Rajaee suggest that the our new paradigm must be "civilization," a paradigm sufficiently broad, inclusive and multidisciplinary to grapple effectively with the positive potential as well as the negative fallout from globalization. Vaclav Havel focuses well the direction of this necessary change in an Op-Ed piece in The New York Times [March 1, 1992]. I quote:
"It is my profound conviction that we have to release from the sphere of private whim such forces as a natural, unique and unrepeatable experience of the world, an elementary sense of justice, the ability to see things as others do, a sense of transcendental responsibility, archetypal wisdom, good taste, courage, compassion and faith in the importance of particular measures that do not aspire to be a universal key to salvation. Such forces must be rehabilitated."
Things must once more be given a chance to present themselves as they are, to be perceived in their individuality. We must see the pluralism of the world, and not bind it by seeking common denominators or reducing everything to a single common equation.
It seems evident to all, I believe, that the prime agents that will have to work together creatively to spread international cooperation worldwide and make it effective are national governments, business [the so-called private sector] and civil society, today represented primarily by NGOs. For the purposes of this presentation I will limit my reflection to the role of NGOs, and of religion and religious organizations as growing dynamic partners in NGO coalitions.
NGOs
Without going into great detail I would like to highlight the present rapid, pervasive global phenomenon of NGOs on all continents—though they are still numerous and weaker in Africa. Newer NGOs include the women's movements, social justice movements, ecology movements, and the list goes on. They represent a genuine hope for a rebirth of civil society at the heart of human society, with governments only in a role of helper. These NGOs still often lack administrative skills and research competence. At times they are merely clones for government or business interests. However, at global networking they are becoming masters. Witness their recent successes in promoting the International Land Mine Agreement, and at least a temporary stalemate on MAI [Multilateral Agreement on Investments], that would have given free rein to foreign investors in host countries—not to mention Seattle and Prague, where they took on the WTO [World Trade Organization], the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund]. Besides, many modern NGOs are helping ordinary people in local situations to perceive themselves as citizens of the world. Some scholars are suggesting that NGOs are "as significant for the later 20th century as the rise of the nation state was for the 19th [century]" [cf. L. M. Salamon, 1994. 'The Rise of the Non-Profit Sector," Foreign Affairs, 73(4), 109-22].
NGOs tend to stand for certain values, such as sustainable development, conservation of nature, human rights, neighbourhood improvements, solidarity, equality, etc. It should be noted that many NGOs are traditional and are really institutions that try to realize their values in a direct, active way. They do plant trees, build schools and hospitals and manage them, lend money to poor women, etc. But, as Lubber reminds us, they also put pressure on other bigger and stronger actors to realize these core values, or at least not to harm them. They monitor business and states, they inform their members, mobilize media and mobilize consumers and voters. They do so by using consumer power. For example, in mature economies, consumers can be mobilized to punish business misbehaviour. Being voters, as well, they can also pressure governments not to tolerate misbehaviour by business, by withholding privileges, permits, etc., or even what they perceive as misbehaviour by other states, by such means as economic sanctions. Some people—perhaps too quickly—are optimistic that this new balancing of power, much aided by the ability of NGOs to communicate worldwide with millions of likeminded people through the Internet, signifies the ultimate death knell of monopoly power in all its multiple forms.
Perhaps the most serious temptation for NGOs today is to pattern themselves on the model of business in order to accommodate government demands for stricter accountability and to solve their own funding problems. Indeed, even more important for human society today than the good work of non-profit organizations is the more basic role and work of volunteerism or voluntary action itself. This phenomenon defies the free-market trend towards putting a market price on literally everything in human life. By "volunteerism" I mean non-paid work in every organization, including business, which can be paralyzed should workers decide to work to rule. Volunteerism renewed and expanded could help a democracy distinguish more clearly between increased employment and increased well-being, between being wealthier and being well off. Governments should encourage non-profit organizations to foster the spirit of volunteerism rather than urging them, as presently, to imitate the practices of business. Such a trend could help to relativize society's need for more formal government and NGOs organized on the business model. This could be a big step towards a "participatory" society and economy. Volunteerism is traditional and pervasive in all societies. It is a matter of publicly recognizing and fostering it, honouring its precious value in our market-crazed situation that wants to put a price even on things most dear and sacred to us. For youth and early-retired workers and professionals the potential for volunteer work aimed at recreating a more vibrant solidary civil society is almost limitless in the modern world. Should NGOs forget that their own roots are nourished and renewed primarily by their closeness to and dependence on widespread volunteerism—that spirit that reaches out to one's neighbour without seeking monetary return—they risk becoming clones of government or business rather than their independent honest critics. Perhaps religion can help to motivate them to do this. [Inspiration for these reflections comes from Gail Stewart, "Volunteerism; Some notes towards a major policy for Canada." January, 1998.]
Religion
In this discussion on religion, I will omit a separate discussion on spirituality, even though I am very much aware that there is also an explosion in spirituality or informal religion, particularly in Western countries, among people who at least are presently alienated by formal or institutionalized religion. However, I do this not because I consider spirituality unimportant in the present context. Indeed, we should not forget that traditional religions have evolved and been renewed chiefly through spontaneous, often anti-institutional, movements of spiritual renewal.
In my discussion of the relationship between development and religion I lean heavily on my consultancy involvement with IDRC [International Development Research Centre], a large secular development research centre based in Ottawa, Canada, with branches in several poor countries. In recent years this research agency has been trying to respond to criticism, especially from Muslim leaders, that their research does not seriously take into account the influence of local cultural and religious values, institutions and systems. In earlier research published in 1995, entitled "Culture, Spirituality, and Economic Development: Opening a Dialogue," I uncovered a strong consensus among nearly 200 theoreticians and practitioners in the development field, in 28 poorer countries, that local cultural and religious values are significant variables and so must be better integrated into research on sustainable and equitable development. IDRC, in cooperation with the Kumerian Press, is now publishing a follow-up series of essays, entitled "The Lab, the Temple, and the Market: Reflections at the Intersection of Science, Religion and Development." Here scholars from different faiths, different intellectual disciplines, and different experiences of development reflect on their personal experiences of integrating these three knowledge/experience systems in their daily lives.
The field of research on religion and development is much more crowded in 1999 than it was in 1994. IDRC can no longer claim to be a pioneer in it, although its attempt to articulate the relationship among science, religion, and development still sets it apart. But now other organizations are taking up related questions. Time limitations require that I mention but a few of these endeavours. I offer as an example of the sheer volume of these new inquiries the bibliography issued by the Centre for Development Research in Copenhagen, Denmark in February 1998. Entitled "Religion and Development," it listed 435 new entries between January 1, 1993 and April 17, 1997. This is a spectacular increase on this ambiguous topic in so short a period, especially when one recognizes that the Danish listing is still far from complete. Most of the entries in this bibliography seem to be written in response to recent world developments associated with the dynamic process of globalization. Many believe that globalization is threatening to homogenize local cultural and religious values and institutions, on the assumption that the present global free-market paradigm, with its Western accompaniments, is inevitably universal.
The various faiths have themselves long been involved in development efforts, but the recognition of the relationship among religion, development, and world affairs is today coming also from other, more unexpected, quarters. James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, himself a practicing Jew, recently initiated a "dialogue" with the leaders of nine of the world's faiths [WFDD, World Faiths Development Dialogue] to find a way to cooperate toward improving their mutual efforts to rid the world of poverty and misery. Likewise, the American State Department, confronted with the reality of Islamic fundamentalism, recently abandoned its long-accepted taboo that religion could not be reported in official diplomatic dispatches as an influence or causal factor in world affairs. Another recent and unexpected champion for the powerful, if ambiguous, influence of religion and culture in shaping present civilizations is Samuel Huntington, the reputed political scientist from Harvard University. In his controversial book, The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking World Order, already mentioned, he argues that cultures and religions are key factors—indeed, even more significant in the long run than economic forces—in shaping world affairs. This perspective clearly flies in the face of the respected business magazine, The Economist, in its persevering declarations that "Asian values" have had no significant influence on Asia's earlier rapid economic development, nor on its recent recovery after a severe financial meltdown.
Ecologists, too, are turning to religion for sympathetic support and motivation. For example, the Centre for the Study of World Religions (CSWR) at Harvard University has, over the last few years, involved over l,000 scholars—religionists, scientists, and ecologists—in its ongoing forum on religions of the world and ecology. The forum aims to recover vision and meaning from religious teachings, to enlighten and motivate people to act decisively on the present global ecological agenda.
Among economists, however, Herman Daly still seems to be uncommon: an economist, who, in his recent book, Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development, specifically invokes religious insight from the Old Testament to root the ethical principles he considers necessary for public policy to manage limits to both natural capital and personal income in order to achieve sustainable development. He finds no other sufficiently effective motivation for crying out "enough" to confront the present manic drive for increased economic growth at any cost.
It is also evident, I believe, that the conversation between science and religion has intensified at the opening of the new millennium. In the last two years, articles have appeared in publications such as Science ("Science and God: A Warming Trend?"), The New York Times on the Web ("Science and Religion: Bridging the Great Divide") and on the cover of Newsweek ("Science finds God"). But popular articles discussing questions like these represent only the front edge of a longstanding research problematic. J. M. Templeton and the John Templeton Foundation have long been investing significant resources into numerous efforts to bring rapprochement and increasing understanding between science and religion. John Paul II's remarks on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica are also highly relevant. I quote, "The unprecedented opportunity we have today is for a common interactive relationship" in which science and religion retain their own integrity and yet are "open to the discoveries and insights of the other." (1988, p. 375). At the September 1998 conference on ecology and religion held by CSWR [Centre for the Study of World Religions] at Harvard, scientists brought the following question to the table: "Can religions of the world adjust or reinterpret their own world visions, stories, and myths of creation to enhance and put soul, meaning and motivation into scientists' current theory of how the universe is unfolding since the initial 'big bang'?"
In recent years both national and international public interest coalitions of NGOs have included Christian NGOs and increasingly other faith-based NGOs representing other religions. There is no doubt that Vatican II's declaration on religious freedom has had the effect that Catholic churches in most countries now act in the public forum as one denomination among other denominations, and are at home in coalitions with other churches, religions and secular NGOs, rather than, as earlier, acting as a state or specially privileged religion. It has also had a major impact on encouraging lay Catholics worldwide to both dialogue with and undertake joint action in coalitions with other religions. Cardinal Ratzinger's recent forebodings notwithstanding, the fact that Catholics now believe that it is the same Spirit/God that ultimately inspires all religions greatly broadens their field for trying to implement Catholic social teaching, especially since this latter teaching now pushes Catholic laity to participate in solidarity with all those who would promote human dignity, human rights and a preferential option for the poor in working for a more just world.
Among recent significant signs of this growing interreligious solidarity and dialogue with other NGOs is an Asian conference organized in Malaysia, in 1997, at the time of the Asian meltdowns, by the [Islamic] International Movement for a Just World in cooperation with the International Christian Peace Movement [Pax Christi], to examine the impact of globalization upon religious traditions and cultural communities. [Joseph A. Camelleri and Chandra Muzaffar, Editors. "Globalization; The Perspectives and Experiences of Religious Traditions of the Asian Pacific, International Movement for a Just World," Selangor Dorul Ehsan, Malaysia, 1988.] An earlier conference, organized likewise by the [Muslim] International Movement for a Just World, featured a dialogue between a Buddhist, Sulak Sivaraksa and a Muslim, Chandra Muxaffar, exploring the question, "Is Asia capable of producing an alternative model of politics that is truer to the values and ideal of Buddhism and Islam and indeed other religions associated with the continent?"
These are a few more striking examples of the significant development underway of a widespread deprivatizing of religions and churches, giving them a more active role in the public forum. This process is well documented and argued by sociologist Jose Casanova of the New School for Social Research in his book, Public Religions in the Modern World [1994]. Casanova defends his central thesis—that we are witnessing everywhere the deprivatization of religion—through sociohistorical case studies in Spain, Poland, Brazil and USA, with corroborating references to similar and even more dramatic happenings on other continents, such as the Islamic revolution in Iran. He documents "the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privileged role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them." [p. 234]. In other words, for Casanova, the narrow secular view that holds that religion is dying or withering away is itself now dead. And more and more sociologists are recognizing this trend. But this is not the place to develop or defend further his unexpected thesis; it is enough to take seriously his cocky challenge to reductionist social scientists found in the final paragraph of his book. He writes, "Western modernity is at a crossroads. If it does not enter into a creative dialogue with the other, with those traditions that are challenging its identity, modernity will most likely triumph. But it may end up being devoured by the inflexible, inhuman logic of its own creations. It would be profoundly ironic if, after all the beatings it has received from modernity, religion could somehow unintentionally help modernity to save itself." [p. 234].
Francis Fukuyama, in a preview article on his book, The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order [Profile Books, 1999], develops a parallel theme—the indispensable role of religion in building or restoring enduring trust in our social relationships. He sees people grudgingly returning to religion, not necessarily because they believe in revealed doctrines, but "precisely because the absence of community and the transience of social ties in the secular world make them hungry for ritual and cultural tradition. They will help the poor or their neighbors not necessarily because doctrine tells them they must but rather because they want to serve their communities and find that faith-based organizations are the most effective means of doing so."[Atlantic Monthly, May 1999, p. 80].
I expect that even if Fukuyama's basic insight is correct, he, and other secular thinkers who think like him, will soon discover that religious belief and genuine religious institutions will not easily lend themselves to being simply a delivery system for the needed virtues to prop up a secular world; they will insist that their own transcendent vision and intimate knowledge of local cultural and religious values and traditions be allowed to substantially influence both the shape and dynamic of the new "reconstituted social order."
There is something more important for the process of development than organizing people, especially poor people, to match Western-designed projects, theories and mindsets. It is their own cultural and religious values and virtues that can, with respect and patience, be engaged to discover multiple ways of fostering local sustainable development. Development need not be dominated by the global competitive free market and its tendency to try to start from a tabula rasa in poor countries, or with the simplest assumption that there is already in place a suitable civil society to undergird its own modern efforts. This is what Western economists did, futilely, in Russia some years ago and, unfortunately, continue to do in many poor countries round the world, with disastrous results for the local people.
In our present turmoil over the future of a globalized economy, many people believe that fear is the only motive strong enough to bring about the radical changes needed for building a sustainable human global community. Fear seems to be the message behind economist Barbara Ward's haunting dictum: "We must love each other or we will die." But looked at more closely, her comment contains an even more fundamental point. It is not just fear of death or annihilation that will move us. Fear does not provide answers. To confront bravely both the external and internal crises of our modern world, to wrestle out answers on other perspectives and worldviews, to take the hand of the infinite, we must have harmonious relations among ourselves. We must love! We must build community with others! So, in the process of global development, there is a central role for religions and spiritualities—however grudgingly accepted—in teaching people, by word and example, how to love, how to foster social imagination and how to revitalize the material focus of globalization; in other words, how to build up solidarity and democratic order among all peoples, including the poor. This is, after all, the goal of Catholic social teaching, as well as of similar social teaching found in other world religions.
And so, in conclusion, I believe that, in this quick overview of globalization and its fallout, I have discovered a very hopeful, unexpected and significant role for NGOs, including faith-based NGOs, in exploiting the positive potential and defying the negative potential of the forces of globalization in working towards a more just and human sustainable global community.